



Reforming the Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives Market: What’s to Be Gained?
Kent Cherny and Ben R. Craig
While derivative ﬁ  nancial instruments have made the hedging and exchange of risk more efﬁ  cient, the recent crisis 
showed that they also pose a substantial threat to ﬁ  nancial stability in times of systemic turmoil. Underlying much of 
this threat is the lack of transparent reporting in the over-the-counter market for these instruments. This Commentary 
discusses the advantages of one solution to the transparency problem: moving the settlement or trading of derivatives 
to exchanges or clearinghouses. 
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United States legislators are poised to pass comprehensive 
ﬁ  nancial reform legislation. While the ﬁ  nal form of the bill 
is yet to be decided, it is almost certain to contain require-
ments for broader regulation of derivative instruments.
The ﬁ  nancial crisis in 2008 saw the emergency merger of 
Bear Stearns with J.P. Morgan Chase, the failure of Lehman 
Brothers, and the near-failure of the insurer American 
International Group (AIG), all of which were major insti-
tutional participants in the derivatives market. Problems 
at these ﬁ  rms revealed uncertainty about the amount and 
interconnectedness of derivatives exposure in the ﬁ  nancial 
system, which, in some cases, contributed to the freezing 
up of markets or forced the Federal Reserve and the federal 
government to intervene in others.
The events of the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis revealed that the 
current derivatives market framework is not robust enough 
to withstand a systemic disruption without exacerbating 
contagion concerns, requiring direct or indirect support 
from ﬁ  scal and monetary authorities, or both.
As we noted in a previous Economic Commentary (July 2009), 
derivatives are used by ﬁ  nancial institutions and corpora-
tions to adjust their exposure to particular ﬁ  nancial risks, 
such as the default of a borrower or wild swings in interest 
rates. Both in theory and practice, these products have made 
the hedging and exchange of risk in the ﬁ  nancial system 
more efﬁ  cient. In its current form, however, the derivatives 
market poses a substantial threat to ﬁ  nancial stability in 
times of systemic turmoil. The lack of transparent reporting 
of trades and exposures leaves both regulators and investors 
uninformed about where risks are concentrated within the 
system. Without this information, regulators cannot monitor 
banks’ exposure to particular risks, and investors cannot use 
market prices to discipline the unbalanced risk exposures of 
their peers.
Changing the way the derivatives market operates, particu-
larly by providing market stakeholders with adequate trade 
and pricing information, would lessen the threat it poses to 
ﬁ  nancial stability without closing off a vital resource for man-
aging risk. One solution to the transparency problem is to 
move the settlement or trading of derivative instruments onto 
exchanges or clearinghouses. These frameworks—already 
successfully employed in other, more familiar markets such 
as those for stocks and options—allow for easier dissemina-
tion of market information as well as institutional oversight 
by government regulators, investors, and clearing entities.Derivatives Markets: Useful, but Not (Yet) Robust
It is worth reiterating the purpose that derivatives serve in 
the ﬁ  nancial system: They allow speciﬁ  c risks to be shed 
or acquired without the purchase or sale of an asset. This 
may not sound profoundly important in abstract terms, but 
a practical example can clarify their usefulness, as well as 
outline the current structure of the market. Suppose a bank 
is approached by a software company looking to take out a 
$5 million loan, and after a thorough review of the com-
pany’s ﬁ  nancial condition, the bank underwriters determine 
that the loan would be a safe and proﬁ  table investment. 
However, the bank’s risk manager informs the underwriters 
that the bank already has a lot of exposure to the software 
industry, and that making the loan would weight the lending 
portfolio too much in one direction. In order to make the 
loan, build the client relationship, and not unduly expose 
the bank to the software industry, the bankers turn to the 
derivatives market.
One kind of derivative—the credit default swap (CDS)—
protects buyers from the default (that is, credit risk) of 
an underlying obligation, and would allow the bank to 
make the loan without adding more software-related credit 
exposure to its portfolio. There is no centralized trading for 
CDSs (like there is for, say, shares of stock), so the bank 
must utilize the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market. 
In the OTC market, the bank would call a series of CDS 
dealers—usually commercial and investment banks—to ask 
for quotes on a $5 million CDS contract on the software 
company in question. Once the best quote is selected and 
a contract is entered into, the bank can lend the software 
company the requested $5 million of funding. The CDS 
makes it possible for the bank to make a proﬁ  table loan. In 
turn the bank pays the dealer a risk premium for protec-
tion against a loan default, and the dealer earns the CDS 
premium in exchange for taking on credit exposure to the 
software company.
What makes this a derivatives transaction? At its inception, 
the CDS contract premium is priced at a level that the two 
sides (counterparties) believe compensates them for the 
risk being exchanged. The CDS is not an asset, then, but a 
formal exchange of future exposure, whose value over time 
changes in relation to the credit risk proﬁ  le of the underly-
ing company. That is, the contract derives its value from 
another, underlying asset: the loan. Also, note that one of 
the counterparties (the dealer) is exposed to the underlying 
loan without actually holding it, a phenomenon that differs 
from nonderivative securities markets.
In this example, the OTC derivatives market appears to 
have improved the efﬁ  ciency of the ﬁ  nancial intermediation 
process. After all, the loan might not have been made with-
out the bank’s ability to hedge against the software com-
pany’s credit risk. A world devoid of derivative instruments 
might still have allowed the bank to hedge its exposure—by 
short-selling $5 million of the software company’s bonds, 
for instance. But when these alternatives become sufﬁ  ciently 
complex and expensive, then derivatives can, theoretically, 
improve ﬁ  nancial market efﬁ  ciency by providing an eco-
nomically viable method for risk transference where one did 
not previously exist.
Still, the overall usefulness of derivatives must consider any 
costs they impose, and in this respect they currently possess a 
signiﬁ  cant downside. Although industry-developed standards 
for the OTC derivatives market exist, there is no formal reg-
ulation or reporting requirements universal to all transactions 
that occur. And while banks’ aggregate derivative holdings 
may show up in their regulatory ﬁ  lings, their trading partners 
and individual exposures are generally not documented.
Perhaps more importantly, there is no central mechanism 
in place to locate exposures as they change hands through 
trading. To use our previous example, if the CDS dealer 
decides it no longer wants the risk exposure associated with 
the software company, it can effectively sell its $5 million of 
software company exposure by buying a CDS from another 
dealer or an investor in the OTC market. By layering the 
contracts in this fashion, the CDS dealer has no net expo-
sure to the software company. However, simply looking at 
the lender’s balance sheet will not tell you that the default 
risk exposure to the software company has been transferred 
to a third party.
The practice in the OTC market of removing exposure by 
buying an offsetting contract makes it difﬁ  cult and costly 
for an outside party looking at the transaction or ﬁ  nancial 
system as a whole to know where the risk now resides. To 
illustrate, ﬁ  gure 1 shows how an investor can buy a CDS 
and then offset the exposure by selling his contract to a new 
buyer. Such chains can grow very large, and although risk is 
being transferred, the parties’ balance sheets will show large 
aggregate CDS holdings (because of offsetting contracts), 
which provide little or no information about actual exposure 
to particular borrowers or counterparties.
This lack of transparency is a serious problem for deriva-
tives market oversight, regardless of whether such oversight 
is in the form of market discipline or ofﬁ  cial supervision 
by regulatory agencies. Both approaches to oversight are 
directed toward maintaining the robustness and integrity of 
the market, particularly in relation to counterparty risk—the 
risk that one side of a derivatives transaction is unable to 
fulﬁ  ll its commitment. In a credit default swap, for example, 
counterparty risk appears in the probability that the CDS Figure 1. Exiting a CDS-Buyer’s Contract in the 
OTC Market buyer stops paying premiums or the CDS seller becomes 
unable to repay the buyer in the event of an underlying 
asset default. While market participants obviously fear 
counterparty risk because they stand to lose money because 
of it, regulators are also concerned about it for a couple of 
reasons. Counterparty risk is a source of contagion in the ﬁ  -
nancial system, and can limit the ability of regulators to dis-
cipline large troubled ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms since the disruption of a 
major market participant’s operations can ripple through the 
positions of all linked counterparties. Second, during periods 
of ﬁ  nancial stress, uncertainty about risk exposures has the 
potential to seize up the ﬁ  nancial system and spill over to the 
wider economy, as institutions seek to limit their exposures 
to each other by pulling out of existing positions en masse.
Mechanisms for mitigating counterparty risk in the sys-
tem include pricing and limits on exposure. For example, 
market participants will increase the risk premium charged 
in transactions with overexposed counterparties or stop 
dealing with them altogether. Financial market supervisors 
may implicitly price the counterparty risk by requiring that 
additional capital or loss reserves be set aside as exposure to 
a counterparty increases. They may also set strict limits on 
exposure to a single counterparty.
Of course, market and supervisory mechanisms for handling 
counterparty risk depend critically on being able to accurate-
ly measure such exposures at any point in time. The current 
organization of the OTC derivatives market makes such 
assessments difﬁ  cult at best, inhibiting market-based and 
supervisory-based discipline, with negative implications for 
the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system. Fortunately, the clearing-
house and exchange models provide a compelling solution.
Central Counterparty: A Robust Alternative
Both counterparty risk and information opacity in the deriva-
tives market can be remedied by centralizing derivatives clear-
ing and trading through a single entity, the central counter-
party. Clearinghouses and exchanges (like a stock exchange) 
are two approaches to creating a central counterparty.
The Clearinghouse
In the clearinghouse model, derivative contract negotia-
tions are conducted bilaterally as they are now, but once the 
terms are set, the two counterparties enter into the contract 
with the clearinghouse, which takes each side of the transac-
tion. To use our ongoing example, the clearinghouse would 
sell a $5 million CDS to the bank and buy a $5 million CDS 
from the dealer, thus becoming the counterparty to both 
sides of the negotiated contract. A default by either the bank 
or the dealer would be absorbed by the clearinghouse, as 
opposed to potentially rippling through a cascade of bilateral 
OTC contracts and disrupting ﬁ  nancial markets.
In order to manage its own risk, the clearinghouse would 
likely employ at least two tools: contract standardization 
and margin enforcement. Standardization of contract terms 
and amounts would make valuation easier for both market 
participants and the clearinghouse, since heterogeneous 
terms—such as differing deﬁ  nitions of “default” for a CDS, 
or an atypical benchmark rate for an interest rate swap—
would become rarer, and trading volume would increase in 
more basic or essential derivatives, aiding price discovery. 
Clearer price signals would aid in margin requirements—the 
posting of capital and collateral by counterparties as the 
value of derivative contracts ﬂ  uctuate. The clearinghouse 
would use margin requirements to protect itself against a 
counterparty default, in which case the accumulated margin 
would be used to compensate the counterparty on the other 
side of the contract while protecting the clearinghouse itself 
from losses.
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ProtectionBy moving counterparty risk out of the banking system 
(where it now resides) and concentrating it in a supervised 
central counterparty, mandated clearing of derivatives 
would centralize information about new and existing con-
tracts, as well as simplify market monitoring by eliminating 
redundant contracts. Clearinghouses could publish pricing 
and volume information that would be useful for market 
participants, and regulators could require reporting of all 
contract holders’ net positions to monitor exposure concen-
trations within institutions and systemwide. And because 
all transactions would occur through a clearinghouse, the 
derivatives exposure reported by an institution would rep-
resent its net exposure (as opposed to a tangle of potentially 
offsetting contracts), greatly simplifying the monitoring 
process.
Recent history illustrates the importance of such monitor-
ing. The insurer AIG nearly collapsed in 2008 due to a 
large, unhedged CDS exposure to mortgage securities. The 
full extent of AIG’s position was unknown to investors, 
counterparties, and regulators at the time of its rescue by 
the Federal Reserve through the extension of a massive, 
emergency discount window loan. A central counterparty 
model for the derivatives market would prevent such infor-
mation lapses from again spiraling into systemic events.
What’s more, a central counterparty can use the aggre-
gated positions of individual counterparties to net out their 
margin requirements. For example, if a bank has to post $1 
million of margin for a CDS contract, but another contract 
the bank has outstanding moves $1 million in its favor, 
the clearinghouse can simply cancel the two out since it 
is counterparty to all contracts in the market. In this way, 
the centralization of trade information lessens the constant 
(and expensive) burden of posting capital in the derivatives 
market, particularly compared to the current OTC market.
The Exchange
An exchange-trading model for derivatives would maintain 
the beneﬁ  ts of central counterparty guarantees and infor-
mation collection, but would add a pricing service. Re-
member that in the clearinghouse model as outlined, two 
counterparties agree upon the terms of a contract and then 
clear it through a clearinghouse. An exchange, on the other 
hand, would actually facilitate the terms of the contract by 
soliciting buy and sell offers from participants for standard-
ized contracts.
A dealer bank, for example, might offer to buy a $5 mil-
lion CDS contract on our software company for a 200 
basis point annual spread (premium) or to sell a similar 
contract for 210 basis points. Out of such price quoting 
from multiple dealers and risk management end-users, an 
active derivatives market would emerge, with centralized, 
instantaneous pricing. Gone would be the days of calling 
up multiple dealers to search for the best price. Instead, the 
exchange would supply a single price for a given standard-
ized contract, and in turn would allow for more dynamic 
margin and collateral calls if prices ﬂ  uctuate sharply. 
Mandated exchange-trading of derivatives would therefore 
provide even more transparency and standardization than a 
central clearinghouse.
An Imperfect Solution
Either a clearinghouse or exchange-trading mandate for 
derivatives would go a long way toward removing the 
problems of opacity and counterparty risk—including their 
contribution to systemic risk—from the market. Because in 
the past these issues have contributed to the possibility of 
contagion (such as through the default of a major dealer 
bank), migrating counterparty risk to a central counter-
party will lessen the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem as it 
currently exists.
But as is nearly always the case, the policy change would 
not be a free lunch. Rather, central clearing and trading 
will simply move part of the TBTF problem out of the 
banking system and into one or a handful of clearinghouse 
or exchange institutions. These new TBTF institutions 
would have to be appropriately supervised to ensure the 
integrity of their risk management practices and manage-
ment. In all, though, the central counterparty model should 
be seen as partially mitigating TBTF since it provides clar-
ity in terms of how ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms and markets are connect-
ed through the derivatives markets—increasing the ability 
of markets and ﬁ  nancial system supervisors to discipline 
ﬁ  rms with excessive exposures to speciﬁ  c types of risk or to 
other ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms.
Another imperfection that central counterparties exhibit 
relates to the inefﬁ  ciencies of standardization. Both clear-
inghouses and exchanges would opt to standardize con-
tracts because it would simplify product offerings (making 
it easier to use them), improve pricing and market thick-
ness, and improve institutional risk management for the central counterparties themselves. For those looking to 
hedge, some efﬁ  ciency may be lost as hedging strategies 
have to be “shoehorned” into standardized instruments. 
But clearinghouses and exchanges will have the ﬁ  nancial 
incentive—just as they do in existing organizations like the 
New York Stock Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change—to create instruments that meet the needs of their 
customers. If nonstandardized derivatives are still created 
and traded, they are likely (and ought) to be costlier and 
subject to higher capital standards to compensate for illi-
quidity. If in the past derivatives have been subject to lower 
or less rigorously enforced capital standards than are now 
being proposed, it suggests that additional pressures were 
externalized to the ﬁ  nancial system itself, with tremendous 
downside risk and consequences.
Finally, a central counterparty mandate is not a magic bul-
let as it does not address the more fundamental regulatory 
and economic questions about how much incremental com-
plexity derivatives—especially those used for speculation as 
opposed to hedging—contribute to the distribution of risk 
in the ﬁ  nancial system. Even so, uniformly applied clearing 
and trading of derivatives would represent a meaningful 
improvement over the current OTC market framework. 
Such a system would engender robustness in this useful 
market by allowing both regulators and market participants 
to manage its safe, efﬁ  cient operation in a newly transpar-
ent environment.
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